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Abstract—The problem of secure broadcasting with indepen-
dent secret keys is studied. The particular scenario is analyzed in
which a common message has to be broadcast to two legitimate
receivers, while keeping an external eavesdropper ignorant of
it. The transmitter shares independent secret keys of sufficiently
high rates with both legitimate receivers, which can be used in
different ways: they can be used as one-time pads to encrypt the
common message, as fictitious messages for wiretap coding, or as
a hybrid of these. In this paper, capacity results are established
when the broadcast channels involving the three receivers are
degraded. If both legitimate channels are degraded versions of
the eavesdropper’s channel, it is shown that the one-time pad
approach is optimal for several cases, yielding corresponding
capacity expressions. Alternatively, the wiretap coding approach
is shown to be optimal if the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded
with respect to both legitimate channels, establishing capacity
in this case as well. If the eavesdropper’s channel is neither
the strongest nor the weakest, an intricate scheme that carefully
combines both concepts of one-time pad and wiretap coding with
fictitious messages turns out to be capacity-achieving. Finally we
also obtain some results for the general non-degraded broadcast
channel.
Index Terms—Broadcast channel, common message, secret
key, secrecy capacity, one-time pad, wiretap coding, fictitious
messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon was the first who studied in [3] the problem of se-
cure communication from an information theoretic perspective.
He considered a noiseless communication scenario, in which
transmitter and receiver share a secret key that is unknown
to an eavesdropper. Used as a one-time pad, this secret key
enables secure transmission of the confidential message.
Subsequently, Wyner considered the noisy case in [4], where
he introduced the so-called wiretap channel. He extended
the problem studied by Shannon insofar that the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper now observe noisy versions of
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the channel input. In addition, there is no secret key available
as in [3] so that the communication must be secured solely
by exploiting the properties of the noisy channel. Recently,
this area of information theoretic security or physical layer
security has drawn considerable attention especially in the
area of wireless communication where it provides a promising
complement to cryptographic approaches; see for example [5–
9] and references therein. These concepts have been extended
to several multi-user scenarios such as the broadcast channel
[10–13], multiple access channel [14, 15], and interference
channel [16]. All these works have in common that no secret
key is available to the legitimate users.
These two approaches were combined in [17–19], which
study the (noisy) wiretap channel with a shared secret key.
This was done from a rate-distortion point of view in [17] and
[18], while [19] established the secrecy capacity for the case in
which no distortion is allowed at the legitimate receiver. The
wiretap channel with a shared secret key and its main concepts
and results are briefly reviewed in Section II. Related to this
problem is the wiretap channel with secured feedback, as this
feedback can be used to create a shared secret key [20–22].
A secret key shared between a transmitter and a receiver
can be used to securely transmit to that receiver. If the rate
of the secret key is sufficiently high, the problem becomes
trivial in the single user setting (i.e., the wiretap channel with
shared secret key) as the whole message can be encrypted with
the secret key and the secrecy capacity is simply given by the
regular channel capacity. However, when the transmitter shares
independent secret keys with multiple receivers, a certain
secret key can be used to securely transmit to the respective
receiver, but might harm other receivers which do not share
this key. Thus, multiple secret keys can result in conflicting
payoffs at different receivers making it a challenging and non-
trivial problem.
Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge the use of mul-
tiple secret keys in noisy multi-user communication scenarios
has not been studied previously. Accordingly, the question
of secure communication in broadcast channels (BC) with
independent secret keys is an interesting extension in this
direction. In particular, this setting describes the problem of
securely broadcasting a common message to two legitimate
receivers, while keeping an eavesdropper ignorant of it. The
transmitter shares independent secret keys of arbitrary key
rates with the two receivers. This model is introduced in
Section III.
Secure communication can now be realized by different ap-
proaches. As shared secret keys are available at the transmitter
and both receivers, this suggests to follow [3] and use them
as one-time pads to encrypt the common message. However,
each receiver is aware of only one secret key. Thus, the more
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the secret key of one receiver is used to secure the message,
the more the other receiver is hurt as the unknown secret key
creates a useless message for it that interferes with the desired
one. We show that when the eavesdropper has the “strongest”
channel (i.e. both legitimate channels are degraded versions of
it), the one-time pad approach is indeed capacity-achieving.
More specifically, both secret keys are used to create two
encrypted messages which are then accordingly encoded and
transmitted with the help of a regular capacity-achieving (non-
secure) broadcast channel code.
On the other hand, the properties of the noisy channels can
be exploited by applying information theoretic secrecy con-
cepts such as wiretap coding [5–9]. This approach is based on
the idea of allocating some of the available rate for additional
randomization to “confuse” the eavesdropper. The drawback
of this is that it reduces the remaining rate available for the
actual transmission of the confidential message. However, this
approach turns out to be optimal if the eavesdropper’s channel
is the “weakest” among all channels (i.e. it is degraded with
respect to both legitimate channels). To this end, the secret
keys are used as fictitious messages for the randomization. As
each receiver knows one of the secret keys, the randomization
overhead to be decoded at the receivers is reduced.
While in the previous cases the eavesdropper has either the
strongest or the weakest channel, the much more challenging
and complicated scenario occurs when one legitimate channel
is stronger and one is weaker than the eavesdropper’s channel.
In this case, it is shown that, to achieve capacity, a careful
combination of one-time pad and wiretap coding with fictitious
messages is needed. The converse involves a non-trivial “sum-
rate”-like upper bound on the common message rate.
The above results are obtained in the context of discrete
memoryless channels (DMCs). We further consider Gaussian
channels, in which the legitimate receivers’ and the eavesdrop-
per’s channel observations are impaired by additive Gaussian
noise. The previous results are extended to this case resulting
in a complete characterization of the capacity of the Gaussian
BC with independent secret keys.
All results are stated in Section IV, while the corresponding
proofs are delegated to Section V. A conclusion is then given
in Section VI.
Notation
Discrete random variables are denoted by capital letters and
their realizations and ranges by lower case and script letters,
respectively; N and R+ are the sets of positive integers and
non-negative real numbers; X − Y − Z denotes a Markov
chain of random variables X , Y , and Z in this order; for
a sequence Xn = (X1, X2, ..., Xn) we frequently write
Xi−1 = (X1, X2..., Xi−1) and Xni+1 = (Xi+1, Xi+2, ..., Xn);
all logarithms, exponentials, and information quantities are
with respect to the base 2; H(·) and I(·; ·) are the tradi-
tional entropy and mutual information; P(·) is the set of all
probability distributions; ⊕ denotes modulo addition and [a]+
abbreviates max{a, 0}; lhs := rhs assigns the value of the
right hand side (rhs) of an equation to its left hand side (lhs).
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel with a shared secret key.
II. WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH SHARED SECRET KEY
In this section we review the wiretap channel with shared
secret key as depicted in Fig. 1. This model generalizes and
combines two important communication models: Shannon’s
cypher system [3] and the classical (noisy) wiretap channel
as introduced by Wyner in [4]. Both lead to fundamentally
different approaches of how secrecy is realized. These are
presented and discussed as well.
A. System Model
Let X , Y , and Z be finite input and output sets. For
input and output sequences xn ∈ X , yn ∈ Yn, and zn ∈
Zn of length n, the discrete memoryless wiretap channel
is given by the transition probability PnY Z|X(y
n, zn|xn) :=∏n
i=1 PY Z|X(yi, zi|xi).
The transmitter wishes to send a message M to the legit-
imate receiver while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant of it.
The transmitter and legitimate receiver share a common secret
key K of rate RK which is unknown to the eavesdropper.
The message M and the secret key K are assumed to be
independent of each other and uniformly distributed over the
sets M := {1, ...,Mn} and K := {1, ...,Kn}.
Definition 1. An (n,Mn,Kn)-code for the wiretap channel
with shared secret key consists of a (stochastic) encoder
E :M×K → P(Xn) (1)
and a decoder at the legitimate receiver
ϕ : Yn ×K →M. (2)
Then the average probability of decoding error at the
legitimate receiver is given by
e¯n =
1
|M||K|
∑
m∈M
∑
k∈K
∑
xn∈Xn
×
∑
yn:ϕ(yn,k) 6=m
PnY |X(y
n|xn)E(xn|m, k)
(3)
where E(xn|m, k) denotes the probability that the message
m ∈ M and the secret key k ∈ K are encoded into the
codeword xn ∈ Xn.
To ensure the confidentiality of the message, we require
I(M ;Zn) ≤ δn (4)
for δn > 0 with M the random variable uniformly distributed
over the set of messages M and Zn = (Z1, ..., Zn) the
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channel output at the eavesdropper. This condition is termed
strong secrecy [23, 24] and the motivation is to have the total
amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper small.
Definition 2. For a given key rate RK > 0, a rate R > 0 is
an achievable secrecy rate for the wiretap channel with shared
secret key if for every τ > 0 there exists an n(τ) ∈ N and a
sequence of (n,Mn,Kn)-codes such that for all n ≥ n(τ) we
have 1n logMn ≥ R−τ , 1n logKn = RK , and I(M ;Zn) ≤ δn
while e¯n, δn → 0 as n→∞. The secrecy capacity C is given
by the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates R.
The wiretap channel with shared secret key has been studied
in [17–19]. The secrecy capacity has been established and is
restated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([19]). The secrecy capacity C of the wiretap
channel with shared secret key of rate RK is
C = max
PUVX
min
{
[I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+ +RK , I(V ;Y )
}
(5)
such that U − V −X − (Y,Z) form a Markov chain.
Depending on whether the term I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) in
(5) is positive or not, capacity can be achieved by using two
fundamentally different approaches for realizing secrecy: the
one-time pad approach or the principle of wiretap coding with
fictitious messages. Both ingredients become most evident by
considering either reversely degraded channels, i.e., X−Z−Y
form a Markov chain, or degraded channels, i.e., X − Y −Z
form a Markov chain. In these cases, the secrecy capacity
simplifies as given in the following.
Corollary 1. The secrecy capacity C of the reversely degraded
wiretap channel with shared secret key of rate RK is
C = max
PX
min
{
RK , I(X;Y )
}
(6)
if X − Z − Y form a Markov chain.
Corollary 2. The secrecy capacity C of the degraded wiretap
channel with shared secret key of rate RK is
C = max
PX
min
{
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) +RK , I(X;Y )
}
(7)
if X − Y − Z form a Markov chain.
Next we discuss both approaches of one-time pad and
wiretap coding in detail and show how they achieve capacity
in the respective scenarios.
B. One-Time Pad
In this approach, we use the shared secret key for encryption
to secure the message transmission. Following the thinking of
[3], the secret key can be used as a one-time pad, for which
the secret key and message must be of the same rate, so that
the secrecy capacity is immediately limited by the secret key
rate RK . Then, the encrypted message is obtained based on a
modulo-|K| addition as
M⊕ = M ⊕K. (8)
The encrypted message is then encoded using a classical
channel encoder and transmitted over the noisy channel so
that the secrecy capacity is further limited by the regular
channel capacity, i.e., maxPX I(X;Y ). Having decoded the
encrypted message Mˆ⊕, the legitimate receiver can then
use the secret key to recover the original message Mˆ , i.e.,
Mˆ⊕ ⊕ K = Mˆ ⊕ K ⊕ K = Mˆ . Since M and K are
uniformly distributed and independent of each other, M is
perfectly secret from the eavesdropper, i.e., I(M ;Zn) = 0,
even if it would be able to decode the encrypted message
M⊕. We conclude that the one-time pad approach achieves
the rate
R = max
PX
min
{
RK , I(X;Y )
}
. (9)
We observe that the rate in (9) is independent of the
eavesdropper’s channel and depend only on the available key
rate and the legitimate channel. Accordingly, this approach
works for any configuration of legitimate and eavesdropper’s
channels.
In particular, in the case of reversely degraded channels, i.e.,
X−Z−Y , the one-time pad approach is optimal as it achieves
the secrecy capacity as given in Corollary 1. However, we
observe that in the case of degraded channels, i.e., X−Y −Z,
the one-time pad approach is suboptimal as the achieved rate
(9) is in general strictly smaller than the secrecy capacity as
given in Corollary 2 since I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) > 0.
Remark 1. We immediately also obtain the corresponding
result for Shannon’s cypher system, which corresponds to the
noiseless case, i.e., X = Y = Z. The secrecy capacity C of
the noiseless wiretap channel with shared secret key of rate
RK is
C = max
PX
min
{
RK , H(X)
}
. (10)
Remark 2. For sufficiently large key rate, we see from (6) and
(10) that the secrecy capacity is limited by the regular channel
capacity, i.e., C = maxPX I(X;Y ) and C = maxPX H(X)
respectively. The influence of the eavesdropper on the capacity
completely vanishes in this case.
C. Wiretap Coding with Fictitious Messages
In contrast to the one-time pad approach, this approach
exploits the noisy channel to realize secure communication.
If there is no secrecy requirement, all available resources are
used for message transmission. To incorporate secrecy, the
crucial idea of wiretap coding [5–9] is now to use a certain
part for randomization by introducing “dummy” messages.
This induces multiple valid codewords for each confidential
message and the one used for the actual transmission is chosen
uniformly at random. The key insight is now to choose the
randomization rate (i.e. the rate of the dummy message) for
each confidential message according to the eavesdropper’s
channel quality, i.e., roughly as I(X;Z). This will saturate the
eavesdropper with useless information carried by the dummy
messages leaving no remaining resources for decoding the
confidential message itself [25].
In the following we present a wiretap coding scheme and
show how the secret key is incorporated. Let us assume that
I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) > 0 and RK ≤ I(X;Z). For any input
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distribution PX ∈ P(X ) we generate |M||K||J | independent
codewords xnmkj ∈ Xn where
|M| < 2n(I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)+RK−2) (11a)
|K| = 2nRK (11b)
|J | > 2n(I(X;Z)−RK+). (11c)
The crucial idea here is to treat the secret key as a fictitious
message for additional randomization. As the size of the secret
key and the dummy randomization messages satisfy
1
n
log(|K||J |) > I(X;Z) + , (12)
we have enough resources allocated to saturate the eavesdrop-
per to ensure that I(M ;Zn) ≤ δn holds, i.e., strong secrecy
(4) is satisfied, cf. for example [26–28].
It remains to verify that the legitimate receiver can reliably
decode the confidential message. Since the legitimate receiver
has the secret key k ∈ K as side information available, the
remaining unknown indices are m ∈M and j ∈ J which are
appropriately chosen to satisfy
|M||J | ≤ 2n(I(X;Y )−). (13)
It is easy to verify that this enables the legitimate receiver to
reliably decode the remaining indices.
In particular, in the case of degraded channels, i.e., X−Y −
Z so that I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) > 0, wiretap coding with ficti-
tious messages is optimal as it achieves the secrecy capacity as
given in Corollary 2. However, we observe that in the case of
reversely degraded channels, i.e., X −Z − Y , wiretap coding
with fictitious messages is in general suboptimal (except for
sufficiently large key rates for which the secrecy capacity
becomes maxPX I(X;Y )).
Remark 3. From (12) we observe that the maximum useful
secret key rate is I(X;Z). Indeed, even if RK > I(X;Z), it
suffices to only use RK = I(X;Z)+ as this already saturates
the eavesdropper’s channel. The secrecy capacity in this case
is then maxPX I(X;Y ) and there is no need for additional
dummy messages for randomization in this case, i.e., J = ∅.
Remark 4. If I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) < 0, e.g., for reversely
degraded channels X −Z − Y , wiretap coding with fictitious
messages in general performs worse than the one-time pad
approach. In particular, if I(X;Z) ≥ I(X;Y )+RK , no secure
communication is possible at all, i.e., R = 0, while the one-
time pad approach still achieves the rate R = maxPX I(X;Y )
in this case.
From the previous reasoning and particularly Theorem 1 and
Corollary 2 we obtain the corresponding secrecy capacity for
the classical wiretap channel without shared key, i.e., RK = 0,
as stated next.
Corollary 3. The secrecy capacity C of the wiretap channel
is
C = max
PVX
[
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] (14)
such that V −X− (Y, Z) form a Markov chain. If the wiretap
channel is degraded, i.e., X − Y − Z form a Markov chain,
the secrecy capacity C becomes
C = max
PX
[
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]. (15)
D. A Combination of Both
The previous discussion has shown that neither of the two
approaches of one-time pad and wiretap coding with fictitious
messages is superior to the other. In fact, whenever the eaves-
dropper’s channel is “stronger” than the legitimate channel
(I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) < 0) the one-time pad performs better
than the wiretap coding approach and vice versa when the
eavesdropper’s channel is weaker (I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) > 0).
In the following, we present a scheme that combines both
approaches of one-time pad and wiretap coding. To make
things non-trivial, we assume RK < I(X;Y ), since otherwise
the secrecy capacity is C = maxPX I(X;Y ) as discussed
above. The main idea is now to use the secret key as a one-
time pad to encrypt as much of the message as possible and
use the wiretap coding approach to protect the remaining part
of the message. Accordingly, we split the message M into two
parts
M = (M ′,M⊕) (16)
with rates R′ and RK , where the part M ′ will be protected
by the wiretap coding approach and M⊕ by the one-time pad
approach. For any input distribution PX ∈ P(X ) we generate
|M′||M⊕||J | independent codewords xnm′m⊕j ∈ Xn where
|M′| < 2n([I(X;Y )−max{I(X;Z),RK}]+−2) (17a)
|M⊕| = 2nRK (17b)
|J | =
{
2n([I(X;Z)−RK ]
++) if I(X;Y )>I(X;Z)
0 if I(X;Y )≤I(X;Z). (17c)
First, we observe that whenever I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) ≤ 0, the
sets M′ and J are empty and we are falling back to the one-
time pad approach as discussed in Section II-B. If I(X;Y )−
I(X;Z) > 0, we use both approaches and secrecy is ensured
similarly as in (12) and (13). To be specific, the sets are chosen
appropriately to satisfy
1
n
log(|M⊕||J |) > I(X;Z) + , (18)
which gives us secrecy, and further
|M′||M⊕||J | ≤ 2n(I(X;Y )−), (19)
which gives us reliability.
Remark 5. For both wiretap coding with fictitious messages,
cf. Section II-C, and the combined approach, the secret key
contributes to the equivocation of the eavesdropper by saturat-
ing its channel. But note that in wiretap coding with fictitious
messages the secret key does not carry any useful information
while in the combined approach it further carries part of the
confidential message.
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Fig. 2. Broadcast channel in which the transmitter shares independent secret
keys K1 and K2 with legitimate receivers 1 and 2 respectively. A common
message M is sent to both legitimate receivers keeping the eavesdropper
ignorant of it.
Remark 6. For the case I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) > 0, both ap-
proaches have the same performance in terms of achiev-
able secrecy rate. However, they fundamentally differ in the
construction and their codebooks are of different size. In
particular, while the overall codebook size of the combined
approach is matched to the legitimate channel (as the receiver
has to decode all three indices), wiretap coding with fictitious
messages uses a codebook whose size is larger than the
legitimate channel would allow, but the receiver can use its
secret key as side information to reduce it to a suitable subset.
III. BC WITH INDEPENDENT SECRET KEYS
In the remainder of this paper we study the broadcast
channel (BC) with independent secret keys as depicted in
Fig. 2. Let X , Y1, Y2, and Z be finite input and output
sets. For input and output sequences xn ∈ Xn, yn1 ∈ Yn1 ,
yn2 ∈ Yn2 , and zn ∈ Zn of length n, the discrete memory-
less broadcast channel is given by the transition probability
PnY1Y2Z|X(y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) := ∏ni=1 PY1Y2Z|X(y1,i, y2,i, zi|xi).
Throughout the rest of the paper we study the particular
communication scenario in which the transmitter broadcasts a
common message M to receivers 1 and 2, while keeping the
eavesdropper ignorant of it. The transmitter shares independent
secret keys K1 and K2 with receivers 1 and 2. The message
and both keys are assumed to be independent of each other
and uniformly distributed over the setsM := {1, ...,Mn} and
Ki := {1, ...,Ki,n}, i = 1, 2. We also write K12 = (K1,K2)
and K12 = K1 ×K2 for short.
Definition 3. An (n,Mn,K1,n,K2,n)-code for the BC with
independent secret keys consists of a (stochastic) encoder
E :M×K1 ×K2 → P(Xn) (20)
and decoders at receivers 1 and 2
ϕ1 : Yn1 ×K1 →M, (21a)
ϕ2 : Yn2 ×K2 →M. (21b)
Then the average probability of decoding error at receiver i,
i = 1, 2, is given by
e¯i,n =
1
|M||K12|
∑
m∈M
∑
k12∈K12
∑
xn∈Xn
×
∑
yni :ϕi(y
n
i ,ki)6=m
PnYi|X(y
n
i |xn)E(xn|m, k12).
(22)
As for the wiretap channel with a shared secret key, we
require strong secrecy of the common message, i.e.,
I(M ;Zn) ≤ δn (23)
with δn > 0.
Definition 4. A rate R > 0 is an achievable secrecy rate for
the BC with independent secret keys if for every τ > 0 there
exists an n(τ) ∈ N, key rates R1 > 0, R2 > 0, and a sequence
of (n,Mn,K1,n,K2,n)-codes such that for all n ≥ n(τ) we
have 1n logMn ≥ R − τ , 1n logKi,n = Ri, i = 1, 2, and
I(M ;Zn) ≤ δn while e¯1,n, e¯2,n, δn → 0 as n → ∞. The
secrecy capacity C is given by the supremum of all achievable
secrecy rates R.
Remark 7. Note that in contrast to Definition 2, the rates of the
secret keys are not fixed and specified a priori. In particular,
Definition 4 allows us to choose arbitrary key rates R1 and
R2. In other words, the key rates are sufficiently high in the
sense that we are provided with as much secret key as we
desire.
From the problem definition, in principle there are different
methods possible to keep the common message secret. The
shared secret keys suggest that we might use a one-time pad
approach which protects the message with the help of the
secret keys similarly as discussed in Section II-B. On the other
hand, the transmitter can exploit the nature of the wireless
channel by using a channel code based on the idea of wiretap
coding as discussed in Section II-C. In the following we
will explore these different approaches and show that which
particular approach should be used depends on the channel
conditions.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we present the main results for the BC with
independent secret keys and discuss the insights that we obtain
from them. The corresponding proofs are relegated to Section
V and the appendix, respectively.
A. Equal Channel Outputs
We start with the simplest scenario, in which both legitimate
receivers and the eavesdropper receive signals of the same
quality and, in particular, Y = Y1 = Y2 = Z.
If a legitimate receiver has no advantage over the eaves-
dropper at the physical layer, wiretap coding as discussed
in Section II-C cannot be used. Accordingly, to secure the
message transmission, we use the secret keys as one-time pads
as presented in Section II-B to create two encrypted messages
M1 = M ⊕K1, and M2 = M ⊕K2. (24)
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Fig. 3. One-time pad approach to the BC with independent secret keys. The shared keys K1 and K2 are used to encrypt the common message M by creating
two independent messages M1 and M2. These two messages are encoded by a classical broadcast channel encoder and transmitted over the channel. Having
decoded the individual messages Mˆ1 and Mˆ2, the legitimate receivers obtain the desired common message Mˆ with the help of the shared keys.
These two messages are independent of each other and then
encoded using a classical broadcast channel encoder and
transmitted to the corresponding receivers. Having decoded
the encrypted messages M1 and M2, each receiver can then
use its own secret key to obtain the desired original message
Mˆ , i.e., Mˆ1 ⊕K1 = Mˆ ⊕K1 ⊕K1 = Mˆ and Mˆ2 ⊕K2 =
Mˆ⊕K2⊕K2 = Mˆ respectively. It becomes apparent that this
one-time pad approach requires a total secret key rate of twice
the common message rate. Since the message M and both
keys K1 and K2 are uniformly distributed and independent of
each other, M is kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper,
i.e., I(M ;Zn) = 0, even if it would be able to decode
the encrypted messages M1 or M2. This encoding-decoding
process is depicted in Fig. 3.
For the case of equal channel outputs we then obtain the
following result.
Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity C of the BC with indepen-
dent secret keys for equal channel outputs is
C = max
PX
1
2
I(X;Y ) (25)
with Y = Y1 = Y2 = Z, i.e., time-sharing between both
legitimate receivers is optimal.
Proof: Achievability follows from using the secret keys
as one-time pads to create encrypted individual messages as in
(24) and time-sharing between these two encrypted messages.
The converse follows from Fano’s inequality and the standard
properties of entropy and mutual information to exploit the
tension from using independent secret keys from the two
receivers. A detailed proof can be found in Section V-A.
From this we immediately obtain the result for the noiseless
case where the output at all receivers equals the input, i.e.,
X = Y1 = Y2 = Z.
Corollary 4. The secrecy capacity C of the noiseless BC with
independent secret keys is
C = max
PX
1
2
H(X), (26)
with X = Y1 = Y2 = Z, i.e., time-sharing between both
legitimate receivers is optimal. 
Remark 8. These results show that in the case of equal channel
outputs the simple strategy of time-sharing is already capacity-
achieving. Thereby, the secret keys are used as one-time pads
to transform the common message into multiple individual
encrypted messages.
B. Strongest Eavesdropper
After having obtained some first insights for the case of
equal channel outputs, we now turn to the case in which all
channel outputs are of different quality but the eavesdropper
has the strongest channel among all receivers in a certain
sense.
Let us first assume that the channels are reversely degraded,
i.e., we have the following Markov chain: X − Z − Y1 − Y2.
Theorem 3. The secrecy capacity of the BC with independent
secret keys for reversely degraded channels is
C = max
PUX
min
{
I(X;Y1|U),
I(U ;Y2)
}
(27)
such that U − X − Z − Y1 − Y2 form a Markov chain, i.e.,
superposition coding is optimal. Further, the cardinality of the
range of U can be bounded by |U| ≤ |X |+ 1.
Proof: Achievability follows from using the secret keys
as one-time pads to create encrypted individual messages and
then using superposition coding. The converse follows from
Fano’s inequality and standard arguments for the degraded
broadcast channel. A detailed proof is given in Section V-B.
Remark 9. The fact that the eavesdropper’s channel is the
strongest among all channels (in the sense that both legitimate
channels are degraded versions of it) suggests to use the secret
keys as one-time pads to secure the message as classical
wiretap coding approaches will not work. In addition, the fact
that the legitimate channels themselves can be ordered due to
their degradedness suggests then to use a superposition coding
scheme (as for the classical degraded BC). The previous result
shows that this reasoning indeed yields a capacity-achieving
coding scheme.
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We have seen that using the secret keys in this way essen-
tially turns the problem of securely broadcasting a common
message into the problem of broadcasting two independent
individual messages. Having this observation in mind, we
immediately obtain the following achievable rate which is
based on the idea of Marton coding for the classical BC, cf.
[29, Sec. 8.4].
Lemma 1. An achievable secrecy rate for the BC with inde-
pendent secret keys is given by
R = min

I(U,W ;Y1),
I(V,W ;Y2),
1
2 [I(U,W ;Y1) + I(V ;Y2|W )− I(U ;V |W )],
1
2 [I(V,W ;Y2) + I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )]

(28)
for any PUVWX(u, v, w, x) such that (U, V,W ) − X −
(Y1, Y2, Z) form a Markov chain.
Proof: A sketch of the proof is provided in Appendix A.
We want to stress that Lemma 1 yields an achievable secrecy
rate for the BC with independent secret keys for the general
case, i.e., no constraints on the channels to the legitimate
receivers and the eavesdropper are imposed.
The previous Theorem 3 assumed that the channels are
reversely degraded. Let us now generalize this discussion
in the sense that we do not impose any ordering between
the legitimate channels Y1 and Y2. But we still assume that
the eavesdropper’s channel is the “strongest” of all channels
in the sense that the following Markov chains are satisfied:
X − Z − Y1 and X − Z − Y2. Then we obtain the following
outer bound which is somewhat similar to the UV-outer bound
[30] or the Ko¨rner-Marton outer bound [31].
Theorem 4. The secrecy capacity C of the BC with indepen-
dent secret keys for reversely degraded channels X − Z −
(Y1, Y2) is upper bounded by
C ≤ min

I(U ;Y1),
I(V ;Y2),
1
2
[
I(U ;Y1) + I(X;Y2|U)
]
,
1
2
[
I(V ;Y2) + I(X;Y1|V )
]
 (29)
for all PUVX(u, v, x) such that (U, V )−X−Z−(Y1, Y2) form
a Markov chain. Further, the cardinalities of the ranges of U
and V can be bounded by |U| ≤ |X |+ 1 and |V| ≤ |X |+ 1.
Proof: The proof of the upper bound in (29) resembles
those of the UV-bound [30] and Ko¨rner-Marton bound [31].
A detailed proof is given in Section V-C.
Remark 10. Similar to the achievability schemes discussed
before, the UV-type upper bound indicates that in the case of a
strongest eavesdropper, the communication problem resembles
the structure of the BC with two independent individual
messages (stemming from the two independent secret keys).
Accordingly, similar to the classical UV-outer bound for the
BC with two individual messages, our UV-type upper bound
becomes tight for the previous special cases of equal channel
outputs and reversely degraded channels. Thus, it recovers the
converses of the corresponding Theorems 2 and 3.
Finally, we want to address the case of deterministic
broadcast channels, for which the channel outputs at the
legitimate receivers Y1 and Y2 are functions of the input X ,
i.e. Y1 = φ1(X) and Y2 = φ2(X). For reversely degraded
channels X − Z − (Y1, Y2) we then obtain the following.
Theorem 5. The secrecy capacity C of the BC with indepen-
dent secret keys for reversely degraded channels X − Z −
(Y1, Y2), for which Y1 and Y2 are deterministic functions of
X , is given by
C = max
PX
min
 H(Y1),H(Y2),1
2H(Y1, Y2)
 . (30)
Proof: Achievability follows from the Marton coding
appraoch in Lemma 1 and the converse follows from the UV-
type upper bound in Theorem 4. A detailed proof is given in
Section V-D.
C. Weakest Eavesdropper
Next, we study the opposite case in which the eavesdropper
has the weakest channel among all receivers in a certain
sense. As the legitimate receivers now have an advantage
over the eavesdropper at the physical layer, it is possible to
use wiretap coding principles as discussed in Section II-C.
Recall that the basic idea of wiretap coding is not to use
all available rate for transmitting the message, but to allocate
some of the rate to “confuse” the eavesdropper by applying
randomized encoding strategies [5–9]. If a sufficient amount
of rate is spent for confusion, the eavesdropper will not be
able to decode the transmitted message. Obviously, the more
rate is allocated to this confusion, the less rate is available
for the actual transmission of the message. Here is where the
shared secret keys enter the picture in this approach. They
will be treated as fictitious messages playing the role of the
randomization resources which are (partly) available at the
legitimate receivers. This approach is visualized in Fig. 4.
In the following we consider the case in which the eaves-
dropper has the “worst” channel in the sense that its channel
is degraded with respect to both legitimate channels. Thus, we
assume Markov chains X − Y1 − Z and X − Y2 − Z; how-
ever, we impose no ordering between the legitimate channels
themselves.
Theorem 6. The secrecy capacity C of the BC with indepen-
dent secret keys and degraded channels X − Y1 − Z and
X − Y2 − Z is
C = max
PX
min
 I(X;Y1),I(X;Y2),1
2 [I(X;Y1)+I(X;Y2)−I(X;Z)]
. (31)
Proof: Achievability follows by treating the secret keys as
fictitious messages as part of the wiretap code. The converse
follows by Fano’s inequality applied to a suitably chosen sum-
rate like bound. A detailed proof is given in Section V-E.
Remark 11. An interesting observation is that in a capacity-
achieving coding scheme, the sum rate of both secret keys
must be equal to the eavesdropper’s channel quality. This
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Fig. 4. Wiretap coding approach to the BC with independent secret keys. The shared keys K1 and K2 are treated as fictitious messages and are used by the
wiretap encoder as randomization resources. The wiretap decoders each have one fictitious message as side information available so that it remains for them
to decode the other (useless) fictitious message and the desired common message M .
saturation leaves then no remaining resources for decoding
of the actual common message.
Next, we want to weaken the “worst” eavesdropper channel
assumption in the sense that we study the case of less noisy
channels instead of degraded channels.
Definition 5. A BC given by its joint probability PY Z|X is
said to be less noisy if
I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) (32)
holds for all PUX(u, x) such that U − X − (Y,Z) form a
Markov chain. In this case we say receiver Y is less noisy
than receiver Z and write Y  Z.
Accordingly, we assume Y1  Z and Y2  Z and,
again, we impose no ordering between the legitimate channels
themselves. The following shows that the capacity result given
in Theorem 6 for degraded channels also holds for less noisy
channels.
Theorem 7. The secrecy capacity C of the BC with indepen-
dent secret keys and less noisy channels Y1  Z and Y2  Z
is
C = max
PX
min
 I(X;Y1),I(X;Y2),1
2 [I(X;Y1)+I(X;Y2)−I(X;Z)]
. (33)
Proof: Achievability follows immediately from Theorem
6. The converse is an adaptation of that used in Theorem 6
incorporating the less noisy condition. A detailed proof is
given in Section V-F.
D. Eavesdropper in the Middle
The previous considerations either used the secret keys
solely as one-time pads or solely as fictitious messages. In
particular, the first approach is optimal if the eavesdropper has
the “strongest” channel and the second approach is optimal
if the eavesdropper has the “weakest” channel. The analysis
becomes much more involved if the eavesdropper’s channel is
neither the strongest nor the weakest.
Accordingly, we study what happens if the eavesdropper’s
channel is in the middle (i.e. X−Y1−Z−Y2 form a Markov
chain). That is, it is stronger than one legitimate channel, but
weaker than the other one. In this case, a combination of one-
time pad and fictitious messages is capacity-achieving.
Theorem 8. The secrecy capacity C of the BC with indepen-
dent secret keys for X − Y1 − Z − Y2 is
C = max
PUX
min
{
I(U ;Y2),
1
2
[
I(X;Y1) + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
] }
(34)
such that U − X − Y1 − Z − Y2 form a Markov chain. The
cardinality of the range of U can be bounded by |U| ≤ |X |+1.
Proof: Achievability follows by applying a combination
of the one-time pad approach and the fictitious messages
approach. In particular, a superposition coding scheme is used
in which the auxiliary random variable U serves as a “cloud
center” protecting the confidential message using the fictitious
messages approach. On top of that, “satellite codewords”
for the stronger receiver are superimposed protected by the
one-time pad approach. The converse follows from Fano’s
inequality applied to a suitably chosen sum-rate like bound
with a careful identification of the auxiliary random variable.
A detailed proof is given in Section V-G.
E. Gaussian Channels
The results above can be extended to Gaussian channels,
where input-output relations are given by
Y1 = X +N1, (35)
Y2 = X +N2, (36)
Z = X +NZ , (37)
where the additive Gaussian noise terms N1, N2, and NZ have
zero means and variances σ21 , σ
2
2 , and σ
2
Z , i.e., Ni ∼ N (0, σ2i ),
i ∈ {1, 2, Z}. We consider an average transmit power con-
straint P .
Since Gaussian broadcast channels are inherently degraded,
the relation among the noise variances σ21 , σ
2
2 , and σ
2
Z im-
mediately determines the degradedness order. Accordingly,
we extend the previous results to completely characterize the
Gaussian case. W.l.o.g. we assume σ21 ≤ σ22 , making receiver
1 the stronger of the two legitimate receivers.
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1) Strongest Eavesdropper (σ2Z ≤ σ21 ≤ σ22): The eaves-
dropper having the smallest noise power, i.e., the ordering is
σ2Z ≤ σ21 ≤ σ22 , is analogous to the Markov chain condition
X − Z − Y1 − Y2. Then the eavesdropper has the strongest
channel as discussed in Section IV-B. In this case, the secrecy
capacity is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 9. The secrecy capacity C of the Gaussian BC with
independent secret keys for σ2Z ≤ σ21 ≤ σ22 is
C = max
0≤α≤1
min
{
1
2 log
(
1 + αP
σ21
)
1
2 log
(
1 + (1−α)P
αP+σ22
) } . (38)
Proof: Achievability follows immediately from Theorem
3 by extending the achievability scheme from the discrete
memoryless case to the Gaussian case. The converse follows
also from Theorem 3 and from the converse for the classical
Gaussian BC, cf. for example [29, Theorem 5.3]. The details
are omitted for brevity.
2) Weakest Eavesdropper (σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ σ2Z): The eaves-
dropper having the highest noise power, i.e., the ordering is
σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ σ2Z , is analogous to the Markov chain condition
X − Y1 − Y2 − Z. Then the eavesdropper has the weakest
channel as discussed in Section IV-C. In this case, the secrecy
capacity is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. The secrecy capacity C of the Gaussian BC with
independent secret keys for σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ σ2Z is
C = min

1
2 log
(
1 + P
σ22
)
,
1
4
[
log
(
1 + P
σ21
)
+ log
(
1 + P
σ22
)
− log (1 + P
σ2Z
)]
 . (39)
Proof: Achievability follows immediately from Theorem
6 by extending the achievability scheme from the discrete
memoryless case to the Gaussian case. The converse follows
also from Theorem 6 together with the ideas for the converse
of the classical Gaussian wiretap channel, cf. for example [29,
Example 22.2]. The details are omitted for the sake of brevity.
3) Eavesdropper in the Middle (σ21 ≤ σ2Z ≤ σ22): When
the eavesdropper’s noise power satisfies σ21 ≤ σ2Z ≤ σ22 , it is
analogous to the Markov chain condition X−Y1−Z−Y2. Then
the eavesdropper has neither the strongest nor the weakest
channel as discussed in Section IV-D. In this case, the secrecy
capacity is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 11. The secrecy capacity C of the Gaussian BC with
independent secret keys for σ21 ≤ σ2Z ≤ σ22 is
C ≤ max
0≤α≤1
min

1
2 log
(
1 + αP
(1−α)P+σ22
)
,
1
4
[
log
(
1 + P
σ21
)
+ log
(
1 + αP
(1−α)P+σ22
)
− log (1 + αP
(1−α)P+σ2Z
)]
.
(40)
Proof: Achievability follows immediately from Theorem
8 by extending the achievability scheme from the discrete
memoryless case to the Gaussian case. The converse follows
from Theorem 8 together with careful applications of the
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Fig. 5. Secrecy capacity of the Gaussian BC with independent secret keys
for P = 2, σ21 = 3, σ
2
2 = 5, and varying σ
2
Z .
entropy power inequality and the maximum entropy theorem
for Gaussian random variables. A detailed proof is given in
Section V-H.
4) Numerical Evaluation: Here we present a numerical
evaluation of the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian BC with
independent secret keys. Fig. 5 illustrates the behavior of the
secrecy capacity for fixed noise variances of the legitimate
receivers as the noise variance of the eavesdropper increases.
As long as σ2Z < σ
2
1 , the eavesdropper has the strongest
channel and the optimal coding scheme relies solely on the
one-time pad approach. Accordingly, the secrecy capacity is
constant in this regime since it depends only on the fixed legit-
imate channels and is independent of the actual eavesdropper
channel. If σ2Z ≥ σ21 but σ2Z < σ22 , the eavesdropper is in the
middle and the secrecy capacity is achieved by a combination
of one-time pad and wiretap coding. Finally, if σ2Z ≥ σ22 , the
eavesdropper has the weakest channel and the optimal coding
scheme is wiretap coding using the secret keys as fictitious
messages. At some point, the sum-rate-like bound is no longer
active and the secrecy capacity is given by the capacity of the
weaker link to the second receiver.
V. PROOFS
In this section we present the proofs of the main results.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
As both legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper all receive
channel outputs of the same quality, we use the secret keys
K1 and K2 as one-time pads to create secure individual
messages M1 and M2 as in (24). Since M , K1, and K2 are
independent of each other, we immediately have ensured that
I(M ;Zn) = 0. Thus, the communication problem reduces
to the reliable transmission of two independent individual
messages. Obviously, the rate in (25) is easily achievable via
time-sharing. (Note that achievability also follows immediately
from the Marton coding approach in Lemma 1. By setting
U = V = W = X in (28) we obtain the desired rate (25).
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However, the time-sharing interpretation is more intuitive and
yields valuable insights for the converse.)
Thus, it remains to show that time-sharing is already opti-
mal. At receiver i, i = 1, 2, we have the following version of
Fano’s inequality:
H(M |Ki, Y n) ≤ ni,n (41)
with i,n → 0 as n → ∞. Making extensive use of the
definition of mutual information and the chain rule, we get
nR = H(M |Ki) (42)
≤ I(M ;Y n|Ki) + ni,n (43)
≤ I(M ;Ki, Y n) + ni,n (44)
= I(M ;Ki|Y n) + I(M ;Y n) + ni,n (45)
≤ I(M ;Ki|Y n) + ni,n + nδn (46)
= H(Ki|Y n)−H(Ki|M,Y n) + ni,n + nδn (47)
≤ H(Ki)−H(Ki|M,Y n) + ni,n + nδn (48)
where (42) follows from the independence of M and Ki,
(43) from Fano’s inequality (41), and (46) from the secrecy
condition.
As (48) must hold for both receivers simultaneously, we
obtain
nR ≤ min
i∈{1,2}
{
H(Ki)−H(Ki|M,Y n) + ni,n+ nδn
}
(49)
≤ 1
2
[
H(K1) +H(K2)
−H(K1|M,Y n)−H(K2|M,Y n) + nn
]
(50)
≤ 1
2
[
H(K12)−H(K12|M,Y n) + nn
]
(51)
=
1
2
[
H(K12) +H(Y
n|M)−H(K12, Y n|M)+nn
]
(52)
=
1
2
[
H(K12) +H(Y
n|M)
−H(K12|M)−H(Y n|M,K12) + nn
]
(53)
=
1
2
[
H(Y n|M)−H(Y n|M,K12) + nn
]
(54)
≤ 1
2
[
H(Y n)−H(Y n|M,K12) + nn
]
(55)
=
1
2
[
I(M,K12;Y
n) + nn
]
(56)
≤ 1
2
[
I(Xn;Y n) + nn
]
(57)
≤ 1
2
n
[
I(X;Y ) + n
]
(58)
with n = 1,n + 2,n + 2δn and n → 0 as n→∞. Here, the
last step follows from Jensen’s inequality and from defining
the distribution PX in (58) as the average of all PXi , i =
1, .., n. This completes the converse and proves the desired
result. 
B. Proof of Theorem 3
As for the equal channel case in Theorem 2 we generate
individual messages M1 and M2 by using the available secret
keys K1 and K2 as one-time pads, cf. (24). Then the achiev-
ability of (27) follows immediately by superposition coding.
Here, we choose the auxiliary random variable U to carry the
individual message M1 (as the “cloud center”) for the weaker
receiver 2. The other message M2 for the stronger receiver
1 is superimposed as a “satellite codeword” in X . (Again,
achievability can also be deduced from the Marton coding
approach in Lemma 1. By setting U = X and V = ∅ in (28)
we obtain the desired rate (27).)
Again, the crucial part is the converse. We have to show that
this superposition coding strategy is already optimal. Using
Fano’s inequality (41) as in the proof of Theorem 2 led to
(43) from which we proceed as follows:
nR ≤ I(M ;Y ni |Ki) + ni,n (59)
≤ I(M,Ki;Y ni ) + ni,n (60)
= I(Ki;Y
n
i |M) + I(M ;Y ni )− I(M ;Zn) + nn (61)
≤ I(Ki;Y ni |M) + nn (62)
with n = δn + 1,n where (61) follows from the chain rule
and the secrecy condition, and (62) from the degradedness so
that I(M ;Y ni )− I(M ;Zn) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2.
Now, we define the auxiliary random variable
Ui := (M,K2, Y
i−1
1 ) (63)
and obtain for the weaker receiver 2
nR ≤ I(K2;Y n2 |M) + nn (64)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2;Y2,i|Y i−12 ) + nn (65)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2, Y
i−1
2 ;Y2,i) + nn (66)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
i−1
2 ;Y2,i) + nn (67)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2, Y
i−1
1 ;Y2,i) + nn (68)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y2,i) + nn (69)
where (68) follows from the degradedness condition. Now, let
Q be a time-sharing random variable independent of all others
in the model and uniformly distributed over {1, ..., n}. We set
U = (UQ, Q), X = XQ, Y1 = Y1,Q, and Y2 = Y2,Q and
obtain
nR ≤ nI(UQ;Y2,Q|Q) + nn (70)
≤ nI(U ;Y2) + nn. (71)
With the same definition of Ui, cf. (63), we obtain for the
stronger receiver 1
nR ≤ I(K1;Y n1 |M) + nn (72)
≤ I(K1;Y n1 |M,K2) + nn (73)
=
n∑
i=1
I(K1;Y1,i|M,K2, Y i−11 ) + nn (74)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(K1, Xi;Y1,i|M,K2, Y i−11 ) + nn (75)
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=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui) + nn (76)
= nI(XQ;Y1,Q|UQ, Q) + nn (77)
= nI(X;Y1|U) + nn (78)
with n = δn + 2,n which proves the converse.
The bound |U| ≤ |X |+ 1 on the cardinality of the range of
the auxiliary random variable U follows from the strengthened
version of Carathe´odory’s theorem, cf. for example [32], and
standard arguments. The details are omitted for the sake of
brevity. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
C. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of the upper bound in (29) resembles ideas of
[30] and [31]. Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3 we use
Fano’s inequality (41) and the fact that Y1 and Y2 are degraded
with respect to Z to conclude on (62), i.e., at receiver i, i =
1, 2, the rate is upper bounded by
nR ≤ I(Ki;Y ni |M) + nn (79)
with n = max{1,n, 2,n}+ δn. Now, we define the auxiliary
random variables
Ui := (M,K1, Y
n
1,i+1, Y
i−1
2 ) (80)
Vi := (M,K2, Y
n
1,i+1, Y
i−1
2 ) (81)
and obtain for receiver 1
nR ≤ I(K1;Y n1 |M) + nn (82)
≤ I(M,K1;Y n1 ) + nn (83)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,K1;Y1,i|Y n1,i+1) + nn (84)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K1, Y
n
1,i+1;Y1,i) + nn (85)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K1, Y
n
1,i+1, Y
i−1
2 ;Y1,i) + nn (86)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y1,i) + nn. (87)
Similarly, we obtain for receiver 2
nR ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Y2,i) + nn. (88)
We continue by considering the sum of the rates in (79) of
both receivers. We obtain
n2R ≤ I(K2;Y n2 |M) + I(K1;Y n1 |M) + nn (89)
≤ I(K2;K1, Y n2 |M) + I(M,K1;Y n1 ) + nn (90)
=
n∑
i=1
I(K2;Y2,i|M,K1, Y i−12 )
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,K1, Y
i−1
2 ;Y
n
1,i)− I(M,K1, Y i2 ;Y n1,i+1)
]
+ nn (91)
where (90) follows from the chain rule for mutual information
and the last step follows the idea of the Gelfand-Pinsker
converse in [33], cf. also [34, Section 7.9.2] and [29, Theorem
8.5 and Appendix 8B] for similar derivations. We continue as
n2R ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(K2;Y2,i|M,K1, Y i−12 )
+ I(M,K1, Y
i−1
2 ;Y
n
1,i+1) + I(M,K1, Y
i−1
2 ;Y1,i|Y n1,i+1)
− I(M,K1, Y i−12 ;Y n1,i+1)− I(Y2,i;Y n1,i+1|M,K1, Y i−12 )
]
+ nn (92)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(K2;Y2,i|M,K1, Y i−12 )
+ I(M,K1, Y
i−1
2 ;Y1,i|Y n1,i+1)
− I(Y2,i;Y n1,i+1|M,K1, Y i−12 )
]
+ nn (93)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y2,i|M,K1, Y i−12 )−H(Y2,i|M,K1,K2, Y i−12 )
+H(Y1,i|Y n1,i+1)−H(Y1,i|M,K1, Y n1,i+1, Y i−12 )
−H(Y2,i|M,K1, Y i−12 ) +H(Y2,i|M,K1, Y n1,i+1, Y i−12 )
]
+ nn (94)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y1,i)−H(Y1,i|Ui)+H(Y2,i|Ui)−H(Y2,i|K2, Ui)
]
+ nn (95)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ui;Y1,i) +H(Y2,i|Ui)−H(Y2,i|Ui, Xi)
]
+ nn
(96)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ui;Y1,i) + I(Xi;Y2,i|Ui)
]
+ nn. (97)
Similarly, by interchanging the order of Y1 and Y2 we obtain
n2R ≤ I(K1;Y n1 |M) + I(K2;Y n2 |M) + nn (98)
≤ I(K1;K2, Y n1 |M) + I(M,K2;Y n2 ) + nn (99)
=
n∑
i=1
I(K1;Y1,i|M,K2, Y n1,i+1)
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,K2, Y
n
1,i+1;Y
i
2 )− I(M,K2, Y n1,i;Y i−12 )
]
+ nn (100)
where the last step follows the idea of the Gelfand-Pinsker
converse, cf. [33]. We continue as
n2R ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(K1;Y1,i|M,K2, Y n1,i+1)
+ I(M,K2, Y
n
1,i+1;Y
i−1
2 ) + I(M,K2, Y
n
1,i+1;Y2,i|Y i−12 )
− I(M,K2, Y n1,i+1;Y i−12 )− I(Y1,i;Y i−12 |M,K2, Y n1,i+1)
]
+ nn (101)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(K1;Y1,i|M,K2, Y n1,i+1)
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+ I(M,K2, Y
n
1,i+1;Y2,i|Y i−12 )
− I(Y1,i;Y i−12 |M,K2, Y n1,i+1)
]
+ nn (102)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y1,i|M,K2, Y n1,i+1)−H(Y1,i|M,K1,K2, Y n1,i+1)
+H(Y2,i|Y i−12 )−H(Y2,i|M,K2, Y n1,i+1, Y i−12 )
−H(Y1,i|M,K2, Y n1,i+1) +H(Y1,i|M,K2, Y n1,i+1, Y i−12 )
]
+ nn (103)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y2,i)−H(Y2,i|Vi)+H(Y1,i|Vi)−H(Y1,i|K1, Vi)
]
+ nn (104)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi;Y2,i) +H(Y1,i|Vi)−H(Y1,i|Vi, Xi)
]
+ nn
(105)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi;Y2,i) + I(Xi;Y1,i|Vi)
]
+ nn. (106)
Now, let Q be a time-sharing random variable independent
of all others in the model and uniformly distributed over
{1, ..., n}. We set U = (UQ, Q), V = (VQ, Q), X = XQ,
Y1 = Y1,Q, and Y2 = Y2,Q and obtain for (87)
nR ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y1,i) + nn (107)
= nI(UQ;Y1,Q|Q) + nn (108)
≤ nI(U ;Y1) + nn (109)
and similarly for (88)
nR ≤ nI(V ;Y2) + nn. (110)
Accordingly, we get for (97) and (106)
n2R ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ui;Y1,i) + I(Xi;Y2,i|Ui)
]
+ nn (111)
= n
[
I(UQ;Y1,Q|Q) + I(XQ;Y2,Q|UQ, Q)
]
+ nn (112)
≤ n[I(U ;Y1) + I(X;Y2|U)]+ nn (113)
and
n2R ≤ n[I(V ;Y2) + I(X;Y1|V )]+ nn. (114)
This establishes the desired bounds in (29) and it remains to
bound the cardinalities as stated. This can be done exactly as
for the UV-bound for the classical BC in [35, Sec. II-C] and
is therefore omitted for brevity. This completes the proof. 
D. Proof of Theorem 5
Achievability follows from the Marton coding approach in
Lemma 1. By setting U = Y1, V = Y2, and W = ∅, the rate
expression (28) simplifies to the desired rate (30).
The converse follows then from the UV-type upper bound
in Theorem 4. We observe that the first two bounds in (29)
can be bounded as I(U ;Y1) ≤ H(Y1) and I(V ;Y2) ≤ H(Y2).
Further,
I(U ;Y1) + I(X;Y2|U)
= I(U ;Y1) +H(Y2|U) (115)
= H(Y1)−H(Y1|U) +H(Y2|U) (116)
= H(Y1) +H(Y2|Y1)
−H(Y2|Y1)−H(Y1|U) +H(Y2|U) (117)
≤ H(Y1, Y2)−H(Y2|Y1, U)−H(Y1|U) +H(Y2|U)
(118)
= H(Y1, Y2)−H(Y1, Y2|U) +H(Y2|U) (119)
≤ H(Y1, Y2) (120)
where (115) follows from H(Y2|X,U) = 0 since the chan-
nel is deterministic and (120) follows from the fact that
−H(Y1, Y2|U) + H(Y2|U) ≤ 0. In a similar way we also
get 12 [I(V ;Y2) + I(X;Y1|V )] ≤ H(Y1, Y2) which give the
desired bounds. 
E. Proof of Theorem 6
We start with the achievability of the rate (31) and then
prove the corresponding converse.
1) Proof of Achievability: The following equivalent de-
scription of (31) turns out to be beneficial for the proof of
achievability.
Lemma 2. The rate expression in (31) can equivalently be
expressed as
C = max
PX
max
0≤α≤1
min
{
I(X;Y1)− αI(X;Z)
I(X;Y2)− (1− α)I(X;Z)
}
.
(121)
Proof: A proof is provided in Appendix B.
Thus, instead of proving the achievability of (31), we prove
the achievability of (121) for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Next we sketch the proof of achievability. Basically, it fol-
lows the ideas of [27, 28, 36] which all present coding schemes
that achieve strong secrecy as required in (23). Accordingly,
for any input distribution PX ∈ P(X ) and α ∈ [0, 1] we
generate |M||K1||K2| independent codewords xnmk1k2 ∈ Xn
where
|K1| > 2n((1−α)I(X;Z)+) (122a)
|K2| > 2n(αI(X;Z)+) (122b)
|M| < min
{
2n(I(X;Y1)−αI(X;Z)−2)
2n(I(X;Y2)−(1−α)I(X;Z)−2)
}
. (122c)
The crucial idea is to use the available secret keys as random-
ization resources instead of generating “dummy” randomiza-
tion indices as in the classical wiretap coding approach. As
the sizes of the secret keys satisfy
1
n
log(|K1||K2|) > I(X;Z) + 2 (123)
we have enough randomization resources to show that
I(M ;Zn) ≤ δn holds, i.e., strong secrecy (23) is satisfied.
This can be done similarly as in [27, 28, 36].
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Next, we check the reliability constraints at the legitimate
receivers. Receiver 1 has the secret key k1 ∈ K1 as side
information available and therefore the unknown indices of
the transmitted codeword are m ∈ M and k2 ∈ K2. As its
size satisfies
|M||K2| ≤ 2n(I(X;Y1)−), (124)
it is straightforward to show that receiver 1 can decode the
remaining indices m ∈M and k2 ∈ K2. Similarly, receiver 2
has k2 ∈ K2 as side information available and the unknown
indices are m ∈M and k1 ∈ K1 of size
|M||K1| ≤ 2n(I(X;Y2)−). (125)
Again, it is easy to show that receiver 2 can decode the
remaining indices m ∈ M and k1 ∈ K1. Thus, we conclude
that (121) is an achievable rate.
Remark 12. For classical wiretap coding, the rate needed for
additional randomization is roughly I(X;Z). This suffices to
keep the eavesdropper ignorant of the transmitted message.
The use of secret keys as the randomization resource has the
advantage that parts of the needed randomization resource are
already available as side information at the receivers. This
reduces the loss in rate in the sense that it is only reduced
by the remaining unknown randomization part (and not by the
whole amount of randomization).
2) Proof of the Converse: It remains to show the optimality
of the above presented coding scheme. The first two bounds
in (31) are the obvious single-user bounds and follow imme-
diately. The crucial part is to prove the third “sum-rate”-like
bound. We proceed as follows:
n2R ≤ H(M) +H(M) (126)
= H(M |K1) +H(M |K2) (127)
≤ I(M ;Y n1 |K1) + I(M ;Y n2 |K2) + n1,n+ n2,n (128)
≤ I(M ;Y n1 |K1) + I(M ;Y n2 |K2)
− I(M ;Zn) + nn (129)
≤ I(M,K1;Y n1 ) + I(M,K2;Y n2 )
− I(M ;Zn) + nn (130)
= I(M,K12;Y
n
1 ) + I(M,K12;Y
n
2 )
− I(M,K12;Zn)− I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1)
− I(K1;Y n2 |M,K2) + I(K12;Zn|M) + nn (131)
≤ I(M,K12;Y n1 ) + I(M,K12;Y n2 )
− I(M,K12;Zn) + nn (132)
with n = δn+1,n+2,n and n → 0 as n→∞. Here, (128)
follows from Fano’s inequality, cf. (41), (129) from the secrecy
criterion, and (132) from the fact that −I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1) −
I(K1;Y
n
2 |M,K2) + I(K1,K2;Zn|M) ≤ 0. To see this last
step, we write
− I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1)− I(K1;Y n2 |M,K2) + I(K12;Zn|M)
= −H(K2|M,K1) +H(K2|M,K1, Y n1 )
−H(K1|M,K2) +H(K1|M,K2, Y n2 )
+H(K12|M)−H(K12|M,Zn) (133)
= H(K2|M,K1, Y n1 ) +H(K1|M,K2, Y n2 )
−H(K12|M,Zn) (134)
≤ H(K2|M,K1, Zn) +H(K1|M,K2, Zn)
−H(K12|M,Zn) (135)
≤ 0 (136)
where (134) follows from the fact that M , K1, and K2
are independent so that −H(K2|M,K1) − H(K1|M,K2) +
H(K12|M) = 0, and (135) from the Markov chain relation-
ships X − Y1 − Z and X − Y2 − Z due to the degradedness.
Now, with this we can proceed with the “sum-rate” in (132)
as
n2R ≤ I(M,K12;Y n1 ) + I(M,K12;Y n2 )
− I(M,K12;Zn) + nn (137)
= I(M,K12;Y
n
1 |Zn) + I(M,K12;Y n2 ) + nn (138)
≤ I(Xn;Y n1 |Zn) + I(Xn;Y n2 ) + nn (139)
≤ n[I(X;Y1|Z) + I(X;Y2)]+ nn (140)
= n
[
I(X;Y1) + I(X;Y2)− I(X;Z)
]
+ nn (141)
where (138) and (141) follow from the degradedness of the
channels. This completes the proof of the converse. 
F. Proof of Theorem 7
The proof of achievability follows immediately from The-
orem 6 so that it remains to prove the converse for the less
noisy case. In the following we will highlight the differences
from the converse proof for the degraded case in Theorem 6.
Following the lines (126)-(132) for the “sum-rate” term we
also obtain
n2R ≤ I(M,K12;Y n1 ) + I(M,K12;Y n2 )
− I(M,K12;Zn)− I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1)
− I(K1;Y n2 |M,K2) + I(K12;Zn|M) + nn (142)
≤ I(M,K12;Y n1 ) + I(M,K12;Y n2 )
− I(M,K12;Zn) + nn (143)
with n = δn + 1,n + 2,n and n → 0 as n → ∞. Here,
(143) follows again from the fact that −I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1)−
I(K1;Y
n
2 |M,K2) + I(K1,K2;Zn|M) ≤ 0. To see that this
also holds for less noisy channels, we proceed as follows.
With I(K1,K2;Zn|M) = I(K1;Zn|M) + I(K2;Zn|M,K1)
we observe that
−I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1) + I(K2;Zn|M,K1) ≤ 0 (144)
which is a consequence of the less noisy condition Y1  Z,
cf. for example [37, Proposition 1]. With I(K1;Zn|M) ≤
I(K1;Z
n|M,K2) we also have
−I(K1;Y n2 |M,K2) + I(K1;Zn|M,K2) ≤ 0 (145)
which validates the correctness of the inequality in (143).
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Now, we can proceed with the “sum-rate” in (143) as
n2R ≤ I(M,K12;Y n1 ) + I(M,K12;Y n2 )
− I(M,K12;Zn) + nn (146)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,K12;Y1,i|Y i−11 )− I(M,K12;Zi|Zni+1)
]
+ I(Xn;Y n2 ) + nn (147)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,K12;Y1,i|Y i−11 , Zni+1)
−I(M,K12;Zi|Y i−11 , Zni+1)
]
+I(Xn;Y n2 )+nn
(148)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi;Y1,i|Ui)− I(Vi : Zi|Ui)
]
+I(Xn;Y n2 )+nn
(149)
where (148) follows from the Csisza´r sum identity [10,
Lemma 7] and (149) from the definition of auxiliary random
variables Ui := (Y i−11 , Z
n
i+1) and Vi := (M,K12, Ui). Now,
let Q be a time-sharing random variable independent of all
others in the model and uniformly distributed over {1, ..., n}.
We set U = (UQ, Q), V = VQ, X = XQ, Y1 = Y1,Q, and
Z = ZQ to obtain
n2R ≤ n[I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(X;Y2)]+nn
(150)
≤ n[I(V ∗;Y1)− I(V ∗;Z) + I(X;Y2)]+nn (151)
= n
[
I(X;Y1)− I(X;Y1|V ∗)
− I(X;Z) + I(X;Z|V ∗) + I(X;Y2)
]
+nn
(152)
≤ n[I(X;Y1) + I(X;Y2)− I(X;Z)]+nn (153)
where (151) follows from letting V ∗ be a random variable
distributed according to the choice U = u∗ that maximizes
the difference in (150). Finally, the inequality in (153) fol-
lows from the less noisy condition Y  Z which implies
I(X;Y1|V ∗) ≥ I(X;Z|V ∗). This concludes the proof of the
converse. 
G. Proof of Theorem 8
Proof of Achievability: For achievability we want to exploit
both previously discussed approaches: secret keys as one-time
pads and secret keys as fictitious messages in wiretap codes.
Therefore, we split the message M into two parts
M = (M ′,M⊕) (154)
with rates R′ and R⊕, where the part M ′ will be protected
by the wiretap coding approach and M⊕ by the one-time pad
approach. Accordingly, we split the secret keys as
K1 = (K
′
1,K
⊕
1 ) and K2 = (K
′
2,K
⊕
2 ) (155)
such that R⊕ = R⊕K1 = R
⊕
K2
to ensure that M⊕ can
be protected following the one-time pad idea by creating
encrypted messages
M⊕1 = M
⊕ ⊕K⊕1 and M⊕2 = M⊕ ⊕K⊕2 (156)
both of rate R⊕.
We use a superposition coding scheme with two layers. For
the random code construction, for any PU we first generate
“cloud centers” carrying M ′, K ′1, K
′
2, and M
⊕
2 . Here, M
′ will
be protected by a wiretap code approach. Then, according to
PX|U we generate “satellite codewords” carrying M
⊕
1 .
Now, the stronger receiver 1 decodes the cloud center
(having K ′1 as side information available) and the satellite
codeword, while the weaker receiver 2 decodes only the cloud
center (having K ′2 as side information available). If we choose
the rates of all messages such that they satisfy
R′ +R′K2 +R
⊕ ≤ I(U ;Y1) (157)
R′ +R′K1 +R
⊕ ≤ I(U ;Y2) (158)
R⊕ ≤ I(X;Y1|U) (159)
R′K1 +R
′
K2 +R
⊕ > I(U ;Z) (160)
R⊕ > I(X;Z|U) (161)
the average probabilities of error become arbitrarily small.
Having decoded M⊕1 and M
⊕
2 respectively, the receivers ob-
tain the desired part M⊕ with the help of their side information
K⊕1 and K
⊕
2 respectively.
It remains to check the security of the transmitted message.
As R′K1 + R
′
K2
+ R⊕ > I(U ;Z) and R⊕ > I(X;Z|U), the
rate of the fictitious messages is high enough to show that
I(M ′;Zn) ≤ δn holds, i.e., strong secrecy (23) is satisfied.
This can be done similarly as in [27, 28, 36]. Note that no
information about M⊕ is leaked to the eavesdropper due to
the one-time pad K⊕2 even if the eavesdropper is able to
decode the encrypted message M⊕2 . The second part M
⊕
1 in
the satellite codeword is immediately protected by the one-
time pad K⊕1 .
Now, by applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to get rid of
R′, R⊕, R′K1 , and R
′
K2
in (157)-(161) having in mind that
R = R′ +R⊕, yields
R ≤ min
 I(U ;Y1),I(U ;Y2),1
2
[
I(X;Y1) + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
]
 (162)
where we observe that the first condition can be omitted as
I(U ;Y2) ≤ I(U ;Y1) holds due to the degradedness. This
concludes the proof of achievability.
Remark 13. We want to highlight the difference from the
previous approach in Theorem 6. There, the available secret
keys are solely used as fictitious messages. From a legitimate
receiver’s perspective, using its own secret key as a fictitious
message increases the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper
but does not contribute to the message rate. However, The-
orem 6 shows that for degraded channels X − Y1 − Z and
X − Y2 − Z this is already sufficient to achieve capacity, cf.
Theorem 6.
The one-time pad approach enters the picture when one
legitimate receiver is stronger than the eavesdropper. Addition-
ally to using the secret keys as fictitious messages, one part
of the secret key is used to create an encrypted message M⊕2
which is also used as a fictitious message part to increase the
equivocation rate. Again, it does not contribute to the message
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rate of receiver 1, but it is useful for receiver 2. To resolve
the mismatch, the stronger receiver 1 receives the missing part
encrypted in the satellite codeword.
This approach is in particular beneficial if receiver 2 is
much weaker than the eavesdropper while receiver 1 and the
eavesdropper are close in terms of channel quality.
Proof of the Converse: We define the auxiliary random
variable
Ui := (M,K2, Z
i−1). (163)
The first bound in (34) is a single-user bound and follows as
nR ≤ I(M ;Y n2 |K2) + n1,n (164)
≤ I(M,K2;Y n2 ) + n1,n (165)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2;Y2,i|Y i−12 ) + n1,n (166)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2, Y
i−1
2 ;Y2,i) + n1,n (167)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2, Y
i−1
2 , Z
i−1;Y2,i) + n1,n (168)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,K2, Z
i−1;Y2,i) + n1,n (169)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y2,i) + n1,n (170)
with 1,n → 0 as n → ∞. Here, (164) follows from Fano’s
inequality and (170) from the definition of Ui, cf. (163).
The crucial part is the second “sum-rate”-like bound. From
the proof of Theorem 6 in [1], we know that n2R ≤
I(M,K1;Y
n
1 ) + I(M,K2;Y
n
2 )− I(M ;Zn) +nn. Following
this, we obtain
n2R ≤ I(M,K1;Y n1 ) + I(M,K2;Y n2 )
− I(M ;Zn) + nn (171)
= I(M,K12;Y
n
1 ) + I(M,K2;Y
n
2 )− I(M,K2;Zn)
− I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1) + I(K2;Zn|M) + nn
(172)
≤ I(M,K12;Y n1 ) + I(M,K2;Y n2 )
− I(M,K2;Zn) + nn (173)
with n = δn + 1,n + 2,n and n → 0 as n → ∞.
Here, (173) follows from the fact that −I(K2;Y n1 |M,K1) +
I(K2;Z
n|M) ≤ 0. Now we proceed as
n2R ≤ I(M,K12;Y n1 ) + I(M,K2;Y n2 )
− I(M,K2;Zn) + nn (174)
= I(M,K12;Y
n
1 ) + I(M,K2;Y
n
2 )− I(M,K12;Zn)
+ I(K1;Z
n|M,K2) + nn (175)
where the first and third term are bounded as
I(M,K12;Y
n
1 )− I(M,K12;Zn)
= I(M,K12;Y
n
1 |Zn) ≤ I(Xn;Y n1 |Zn) (176)
≤ n[I(X;Y1|Z)] = n[I(X;Y1)− I(X;Z)]. (177)
Here, (176) holds due X−Y1−Z. The second term becomes
I(M,K2;Y
n
2 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y2,i) (178)
which follows as in (165)-(170). And finally, the last term is
I(K1;Z
n|M,K2) =
n∑
i=1
I(K1;Zi|M,K2, Zi−1) (179)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(K1, Xi;Zi|M,K2, Zi−1) (180)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|M,K2, Zi−1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|Ui). (181)
Now, by following standard arguments of introducing a time-
sharing random variable independent of all others and uni-
formly distributed over {1, ..., n}, it is straightforward to
finally obtain R ≤ I(U ;Y2) + 1,n and 2R ≤
[
I(X;Y1) +
I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
]
+ n.
The bound |U| ≤ |X |+ 1 on the cardinality of the range of
the auxiliary random variable U follows from the strengthened
version of Carathe´odory’s theorem, cf. [32]. 
H. Proof of Theorem 11
Achievability follows from the corresponding scheme for
discrete memoryless channels in Theorem 8, where we choose
U ∼ αP (wiretap coding), V ∼ (1−α)P (additional one-time
pad part), and X = U + V with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 parametrizing the
power allocation between the two schemes.
The converse follows from an application of the entropy
power inequality and the maximum entropy theorem. We write
the first condition in (34) as
I(U ;Y2) = h(Y2)− h(Y2|U) (182)
with h(·) the differential entropy. By the maximum en-
tropy theorem, the first term is upper bounded by h(Y2) ≤
1
2 log(2pie(P +σ
2
2)). For the second term h(Y2|U) we observe
1
2
log(2pieσ22) = h(N2) = h(Y2|X) ≤ h(Y2|U) (183)
≤ h(Y2) ≤ 1
2
log(2pie(P + σ22)) (184)
so that there must exist an α ∈ [0, 1] such that
h(Y2|U) = 1
2
log
(
2pie((1− α)P + σ22)
)
. (185)
With this, we obtain for the first expression in (34)
I(U ;Y2) ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
(1− α)P + σ22
)
(186)
which already establishes the first bound in (40) as desired.
With I(X;Z) = I(U ;Z) + I(X;Z|U) we can write the
second condition in (34) as
I(X;Y1) + I(U ;Y2)− I(X;Z) + I(X;Z|U). (187)
In the following, we will bound each term separately. From
(186) we already know that I(U ;Y2) ≤ 12 log(1+ αP(1−α)P+σ22 ).
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Following the proof for the classical Gaussian wiretap channel
by using the entropy power inequality, we further get
I(X;Y1)− I(X;Z) ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ21
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2Z
)
.
(188)
Thus, it remains to bound the last term I(X;Z|U) as
I(X;Z|U) = h(Z|U)− h(Z|U,X) (189)
= h(Z|U)− 1
2
log(2pieσ2Z). (190)
To bound the remaining term, we apply the entropy power
inequality as follows:
h(Y2|U) = h(Z + N˜ |U) (191)
≥ 1
2
log
(
22h(Z|U) + 22h(N˜ |U)
)
(192)
=
1
2
log
(
22h(Z|U) + 2pie(σ22 − σ2Z)
)
(193)
where N˜ is Gaussian distributed with variance σ22−σ2Z . Now,
we choose α as in (185) to obtain
2pie((1− α)P + σ22) ≥ 22h(Z|U) + 2pie(σ22 − σ2Z) (194)
so that
h(Z|U) ≤ 1
2
log
(
2pie((1− α)P + σ2Z)
)
. (195)
Now, putting everything together yields
I(X;Y1) + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
≤ 1
2
[
log
(
1 +
P
σ21
)
+ log
(
1 +
αP
(1− α)P + σ22
)
− log
(
1 +
αP
(1− α)P + σ2Z
)]
(196)
which yields the remaining bound in (40). This completes the
converse and therewith the proof. 
VI. CONCLUSION
A secret key shared between a transmitter and a receiver
clearly helps to securely communicate in the presence of
an eavesdropper. In the “single-user” user scenario of the
wiretap channel with shared secret key, the gain in secrecy
capacity can immediately be quantified. It corresponds to the
key rate of the shared secret key which agrees with common
intuition. The same question becomes much more involved
and non-trivial to answer for more complex communication
scenarios in which multiple secret keys are shared among
the legitimate users. Shared secret keys suggest the use of
one-time pads to encrypt confidential messages for keeping
external eavesdroppers ignorant. However, a secret key shared
between the transmitter and one receiver might harm other
receivers which do not share this key. Thus, multiple secret
keys can result in conflicting payoffs at different receivers,
which raises the question of how these keys should be used
in an optimal way. In this paper, we have studied the BC with
independent secret keys in which a common message must be
securely transmitted to two legitimate receivers each of which
shares an independent secret key with the transmitter. This is
the simplest extension beyond the single-user wiretap channel
that captures the above mentioned effects.
For situations in which the eavesdropper’s channel is
“stronger” than the legitimate channels, classical wiretap cod-
ing does not work and the message must be protected by using
the secret keys as one-time pads. For several special cases
such as the noiseless BC, BC with equal channel outputs, or
degraded BC, it has been shown that this strategy is actually
optimal and the secrecy capacity has been established. On
the other hand, in situations in which the eavesdropper’s
channel is the “weakest” channel, it has been shown that it
is optimal to use the secret keys not as one-time pads but
as fictitious messages for randomization in wiretap coding.
The corresponding secrecy capacity has been established as
well. The most challenging case is when the eavesdropper
has neither the strongest nor the weakest channel. Here, a
careful combination of the one-time pad approach and wiretap
coding with fictitious messages is needed to establish the
secrecy capacity for this case. First, these problems have been
addressed for the situation in which all channels are discrete
memoryless. Then, Gaussian channels have been considered
and the previous results have been extended to this case as well
yielding a complete characterization of the secrecy capacity of
the Gaussian BC with independent secret keys.
For future work, it would be interesting to study how
these results obtained for the case of two legitimate receivers
extend to an arbitrary number of legitimate receivers. Another
direction for future work would be to characterize how large
of secret key rates are needed to achieve capacity and what
happens if the secret key rates are bounded below those rates.
APPENDIX
A. Sketch of Proof of Lemma 1
As described in Section IV-A, the secret keys are used as
one-time pads to create individual encrypted messages M1 =
M⊕K1 and M2 = M⊕K2, cf. (24) and Fig. 3, which are then
encoded and transmitted. As M , K1, and K2 are independent
of each other, we immediately have I(M ;Zn) = 0 even if the
eavesdropper would able to decode the encrypted messages
M1 or M2.
Now, the achievability of the rate given in (28) follows from
the idea of Marton coding for the classical BC, cf. [29, Sec.
8.4]. In particular, the created individual messages M1 and M2
are encoded following this approach which yields the bounds
on the rate as given in (28), cf. [29, Proposition 8.1]. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
With the function
f(t)=
{
(1−t)I(X;Y1) + t[I(X;Y2)− I(X;Z)] if t ≤ 12
(1−t)[I(X;Y1)− I(X;Z)] + tI(X;Y2) if t ≥ 12
(197)
we can express the rate expression in (31) as
C = max
PX
min
0≤t≤1
f(t). (198)
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As the function f(t) is piecewise linear, it is sufficient to
evaluate it at the corner points, i.e., when t = 0, t = 1, and
t = 12 , to convince ourself that the rate expressions in (31)
and (198) are equivalent.
Now we have to show that (198) is equivalent to the desired
expression (121). Therefore, we rewrite (121) (where we omit
the outer maximization for short) as
max
0≤α≤1
min
0≤t≤1
[
(1− t)[I(X;Y1)− αI(X;Z)]
+ t
[
I(X;Y2)− (1− α)I(X;Z)
]]
= min
0≤t≤1
max
0≤α≤1
[
(1− t)[I(X;Y1)− αI(X;Z)]
+ t
[
I(X;Y2)− (1− α)I(X;Z)
]] (199)
where the equality follows from the minimax theorem. Now
eliminating α in (199) yields for t ≤ 12 and t ≥ 12 the
corresponding expressions in (198) which are then equivalent
to the original formulation (31). 
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